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Abstract
Background: Live-animal markets are a culturally important feature of meat distribution chains in many
populations, yet they provide an opportunity for the maintenance and transmission of potentially emergent
zoonotic pathogens. The ongoing human outbreak of avian H7N9 in China highlights the need for increased
surveillance and control in these live-bird markets (LBMs).
Discussion: Closure of retail markets in affected areas rapidly decreased human cases to rare, sporadic occurrence,
but little attention has been paid thus far to the role of upstream elements of the poultry distribution chain such as
wholesale markets. This could partly explain why transmission in poultry populations has not been eliminated more
broadly. We present surveillance data from both wholesale live-bird markets (wLBMs) and rLBMs in Shantou, China
(from 2004–2006), and call on disease-dynamic theory to illustrate why closing rLBMs has only minor effects on the
overall volume of transmission. We show that the length of time birds stay in rLBMs can severely limit transmission
there, but that the system-wide effect may be reduced substantially by high levels of transmission upstream of retail
markets.
Summary: Management plans that minimize transmission throughout the entire poultry supply chain are essential
for minimizing exposure to the public. These include reducing stay-time of birds in markets to 1 day, standardizing
poultry supply chains to limit transmission in pre-retail settings, and monitoring strains with epidemiological traits
that pose a high risk of emergence. These actions will further limit human exposure to extant viruses and reduce
the likelihood of the emergence of novel strains by decreasing the overall volume of transmission.
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Background and discussion
Retail live-bird markets (rLBMs) LBMs are the main focus
of control of AIVs in poultry supply chains because this is
where the largest number of humans contact live birds,
and humans have been infected repeatedly with strains
circulating in rLBMs [1,2]. Retail LBMs are thought to
provide a mixing ground for the emergence of novel
strains because strains from different sources are brought
together in a setting with high host-species diversity and
density [3]. However, this hypothesis requires that trans-
mission followed by viral replication and possibly reassort-
ment occurs within rLBMs. Perhaps surprisingly, little is
known about how rLBMs contribute to AIV transmission.
A recent analysis of surveillance data from rLBMs in
Shantou, China found that the prevalence of H5 and H9
in chickens could not be predicted from their corre-
sponding prevalences in ducks and quail within those
same markets [4], suggesting that a substantial proportion
of transmission may occur in contexts other than rLBMs.
Also, AIVs can be isolated at high rates from other hold-
ings that form the supply chain for rLBMs [5].
Insight from basic epidemic theory
Despite a lack of empirical studies of the transmission of
influenza in rLBMs, well-established ideas from epidemic
theory enable us to make mechanistic predictions about
prevalence patterns within them. Incubation periods for
AIVs in poultry can be up to 2 days when birds are inocu-
lated with doses less than or equal to 103, and around
1 day when doses are higher [6]. Making the worst-case
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assumption that susceptible and infectious hosts are in
constant contact, this means that the minimum time in-
fectious individuals can create other infectious individuals
is 1 day, and higher on average. Thus, if the average stay-
time of birds in rLBMs is ≤ 2 days, there is not time for ex-
ponential growth of prevalence due to direct transmission
within rLBMs (e.g., “outbreaks”). In addition, direct trans-
mission alone may not cause significant amplification of
prevalence within rLBMs because birds that entered the
market uninfected have a high probability of being slaugh-
tered before they begin shedding AIV. A similar principle
has been identified in other animal-disease systems. For
example, epizootics of plague in prairie dog populations
have been shown not to occur by blocked-flea or pneu-
monic transmission alone, because both blocked vectors
and hosts capable of direct transmission are removed from
the population by death before they reliably create large
chains of transmission required for outbreaks [7]. Essen-
tially, direct transmission in rLBMs should be limited by
the interplay of stay-times and incubation periods.
Retail LBMs are also thought to foster persistence of
AIVs in the environment, creating another source of trans-
mission [3]. The importance of an environmental factor in
viral persistence has been shown in an experiment that
monitored AIV isolation rates before and after days that
the market was disinfected [8]. However, whether this en-
vironmental persistence adds to transmission has not been
determined empirically. Theoretically, indirect transmis-
sion via an environmental reservoir could contribute to
the overall force of infection within rLBMs by providing a
sustained source of AIV (i.e., by providing a transmission
link between birds even if they do not occupy the market
at the same time) [9]. Indirect transmission can occur
through a variety of routes, including viruses in drinking
water, in feces on the ground or on surfaces in cages. All
of these routes rely on three main processes: shedding
rates into/on a particular environmental feature, decay
rates of the virus in it, and contact of susceptible birds
with it. Intuitively, one would predict that indirect trans-
mission would be most significant when shedding rates
are high, decay rates are low and contact rates are high.
Models can illustrate the amplitude of these trade-offs
We illustrate the tradeoffs between these three processes
using a simple mathematical model (Additional file 1:
Text S1). Contact rates with contaminated environmen-
tal reservoirs and shedding rates are the strongest deter-
minants of mean daily prevalence in poultry in rLBMs
(Additional file 2: Figure S1). Our simple model also
helps to illustrate how transmission levels within rLBMs
are strongly dependent on stay-times in markets. When
the incubation period of an emergent virus in a susceptible
host is 1 day, mean daily prevalence increases by 250%
when stay-time is increased from 1–2 days (Figure 1A).
The rise in prevalence is not linear: it slows for stay-times
greater than 3 days. The remarkable effects of stay-time
on prevalence highlights why bans on overnight poultry
storage in live-bird markets in Hong Kong have been so
effective at eliminating AIVs [10]. Furthermore, although
high-demand poultry such as chickens tend to have short
stay-times in markets, quail and other minor poultry may
remain longer due to lower demand. The longer stay-
times for quail could partly explain why they have been
implicated as intermediate hosts in the emergence of
novel strains, and why excluding them from rLBMs in
Hong Kong is associated with reduced prevalence in
chickens [11]. Short, standardized stay-times for all host
species in markets seems important for both controlling
AIV prevalence and, potentially, for gaining a fundamental
understanding of which host species may contribute most
to the risk of emergence in humans.
We used the model to investigate the relationship
between: incidence of infection in rLBMs; the use of
decontamination practices (that decrease environmental
transmission); and the rate of influx of susceptible birds.
When decontamination routines remove 100% of virus
from the environment and there are no infected birds en-
tering retail markets from wholesale markets, as would be
expected, decontamination is > 99% effective even when it
occurs infrequently (i.e., every 2 weeks) (Figure 1B, left).
In contrast, when continual introduction of AIV from
wLBMs contributes to prevalence levels in rLBMs, as is
likely the case, rigorous decontamination (100% efficacy)
is only 50% effective at decreasing environmental contam-
ination when decontamination occurs as often as weekly
(Figure 1B, right). The constant influx of infected birds
leads to conditions where decontamination must occur
more often than weekly in order to reduce environmental
contamination by more than 50% Figure 1B, right).
However, when decontamination practices are less than
100% effective, prevalence of the virus in the environment
is much less affected by the influx of susceptible birds
(Figure 1B) and stay-times (Additional file 3: Figure S2)
showing that there is less opportunity for the management
of stay-times to act synergistically with decontamination
(Figure 1B and Additional file 3: Figure S2). In order to
design effective strategies to eliminate AIVs from rLBMs,
there is a need for systematic empirical studies to accur-
ately quantify the role of prevalence of infection in up-
stream components of the poultry production system (e.g.,
wLBMs, farms and intermediate holdings) in reducing the
efficacy of decontamination practices at rLBMs.
The model results are calibrated with surveillance data
for H9 subtypes in a major wLBM and nine rLBMs in
Shantou, China [5], showing that average prevalence in
rLBM is roughly twice as high as prevalence in wLBM
(means ± standard deviation (medians): 4.9% ± 5.5% (3.3%)
in rLBM versus 2.7% ± 7.5% (0.5%) in wLBMs; Figure 2).
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Comparison of these numbers alone does not reveal how
much transmission occurs in either setting because birds
could have been infected prior to arrival in either setting
[12]. For example, some birds may become exposed in
wLBMs but are not detected as infected until they enter
rLBMs. Combining this logic with the observed prevalence
data suggests that > 50% of the transmission that cre-
ated this prevalence in rLBMs occurs before the birds
arrive. Conditions in wLBMs may create potent oppor-
tunities for transmission: birds in wLBMs are kept at
high density in one space (rather than separated in
cages as in rLBMs) and birds remain longer in wLBMs
than rLBMs (Figure 3).
Going beyond H5N1
The scientific community forecasted key elements of
the emergent H7N9 virus by prior surveillance, labora-
tory studies and clinical observations [13,14]. H9N2 vi-
ruses were predicted to pose a risk of novel-strain
emergence due to their: propensity to co-infect with
other subtypes, dominance in rLBMs, broad host range,
dominance in chickens (the most numerous poultry
species), low virulence (i.e., low detectability) and capability
Figure 2 Distribution of bi-weekly prevalence samples of H9 in
chickens between 2005–2006 in Shantou, China in the largest
wholesale market (red) and nine retail markets (black). Each
monthly estimate of prevalence was considered. The x-axis represents
monthly prevalence of H9 binned at an interval of 2% prevalence. Note
that one monthly sample from the wholesale market was unusually
high at 44% and thus the plot is truncated between 22 and 44% as
indicated by the squiggly dotted lines. The means ± 1 standard
deviation (and medians enclosed in brackets) for the monthly
prevalence measures indicate that prevalence in wholesale markets
may be as much as 50% that in retail markets.
Figure 1 Model output. A. Effects of stay-time in retail markets on infection prevalence. Impact of stay-times on prevalence is most dramatic at
stay-times less than 2 days. Simulations (N = 3528; for all possible combinations of parameters in Additional file 1: Table S1) were run under different
combinations of parameter values (see Additional file 2: Figure S1) for each stay-time indicated on X-axis. Mean daily prevalence (over 1 year) was
calculated for each parameter set. Each bar reflects an overall mean across parameter sets. These overall means were expressed as prevalence relative
to the lowest stay-time (0.5 days; i.e., bars show ((mi – m0.5) / m0.5)×100, where m = mean prevalence across parameters sets, i = 1, 1.5, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4
days). Absolute values of prevalence will depend on specific parameter values; qualitative results are robust; higher transmission rates lead to larger
effects of stay-time (Additional file 2: Figure S1B). B. Impact of influx of chickens on effectiveness of decontamination in retail markets. Difference
between mean prevalence of the ‘reference’ scenario (no disinfection routine) and mean prevalence under each treatment, divided by the reference
and expressed as a percent. The frequency of disinfection is shown on X-axis. Efficacy of disinfection (i.e. 100, 90 and 50%) is indicated in the legend
with a stay-time of 3 days. Left panel: Infected hosts were introduced only once at the start of the simulation (initial prevalence = 0.1%) and only
susceptible or recovered hosts entered the market thereafter. Right panel: The number of infected hosts entering retail markets at each time step was
chosen randomly from the distribution of prevalences in the wholesale market (Figure 2, red bars).
Pepin et al. BMC Infectious Diseases 2013, 13:592 Page 3 of 6
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/13/592
of infecting humans [5,13-15]. These warnings were first
publicized 14 years ago when it was suggested that genetic
material from H9N2 subtypes contributed to the emer-
gence of H5N1 in 1997 in Hong Kong [16]. The recent
finding that the internal genes of the novel H7N9 strain
come from an H9N2 strain [2] validates predictions from
surveillance data and further emphasizes the need to
understand the multi-host epidemiology of H9N2 viruses.
Prevention of the emergence of novel strains with pan-
demic potential will require the identification of strains that
are high risk such as H9N2 and the taking of measures to
eliminate them. Once elimination is achieved, it may be ap-
propriate to list these strains under the World Organization
for Animal Health (OIE) definition for high-risk strains so
that more extreme measures can be used to control their
re-introduction. In any case, it is worth placing more
emphasis on control of emergent strains - those with epi-
demiological traits that favor emergence - not just those
that have shown a history of causing HP AIV infections.
Summary
Our model demonstrates how the interplay between
stay-time of birds in rLBMs, prevalence of infection in
birds entering the rLBMs, and levels of infectious virus
within rLBMs ultimately determine how effective a spe-
cific intervention will be. Combined with surveillance data
from Shantou, several general guidelines for surveillance
and control of AIV in poultry become clear. In rLBMs,
the lowest risk to humans will be achieved by limiting
stay-times to 1 day for all bird species, conducting effect-
ive decontamination as frequently as possible and taking
measures to minimize the persistence of AIVs in drinking
Figure 3 Schematic of the poultry supply chain. Birds are brought to wholesale markets from several independent (often undocumented)
locations and flock owners. The source for birds changes constantly and varies from large-scale operations with thousands of birds per farm to
family-owned backyard flocks. In wholesale markets, birds are kept at very high density in large pens. There is interaction with poultry caretakers
as well as poultry traders, but not the general public. From wholesale markets, birds are brought to several retail markets where they are kept at
high density in small, stacked cages. Thus, the bird population is more structured in retail markets. Also, the stay-time of birds in retail markets is
much shorter than in wholesale markets.
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water, such as altering water temperature, pH, salinity or
organic content [9,17]. This has been achieved in Hong
Kong and thus should be possible more broadly. However,
AIVs will continue to threaten public health until their
prevalence is reduced in other holdings that supply
rLBMs. Due to the complex patterns of host species usage
by different AIV subtypes [5], other important steps to
decrease transmission (and potential reassortment) in
wLBMs and other pre-rLBM settings include reducing
stay-time, implementing structures to minimize host
mixing, and preventing cross-species contact of shared
resources.
Repeated outbreaks of avian influenza in humans may
eventually justify more substantial changes to the poultry
distribution system in some countries. A broad restructur-
ing of the poultry distribution system would greatly help
to reduce environmental contamination and thus risk of
transmission in both poultry and humans. Key changes
would include a shift from rLBMs to cold-chain distribu-
tion, and introduction of a centralized slaughter system
with standardized, hygienic practices for slaughter, decon-
tamination, and waste processing. These changes are more
difficult to implement in some countries because of the
cultural and social importance of rLBMs as well as the
ever-changing animal-trade network which involves many
small businesses. Nevertheless, policies that require stan-
dardized poultry supply activities, with minimal stay-times
of birds in any specific holding and minimal transfers
between holdings before entering rLBMs are essential
to control the transmission of AIVs in poultry popula-
tions, and thus prevent the emergence of novel strains.
Systematic sampling and testing in a geographically rep-
resentative sample of large Chinese wLBMs should be
undertaken urgently. Both the 2009 emergence of hu-
man H1N1 in the North American pork supply chain
and the 2013 H7N9 outbreak of H7N9 in the Chinese
poultry supply chain motivate a transition from ad hoc
academic studies to systematic representative surveillance
of influenza A viruses in key livestock populations.
Additional files
Additional file 1: Supplementary materials.
Additional file 2: Figure S1. A. Uncertainty analysis for transmission
parameters. Set of mean daily prevalence over 1 year for different stay-
times in retail markets (x-axis). Results are from all possible combinations
of the parameter values listed in Additional file 1: Table S1 for
transmission rate, shedding rate, decay rate and proportion susceptible.
Ten infected hosts (0.1% of N) were introduced once on day 0. Medians
for each set of parameters are indicated as small circles. Results within
the 75th quantile include the thin lines and below them. B. Effects of
individual parameters on model output. Each point represents a simulation
with the x-axis value of the indicated parameter and all possible values
(given in A) for each other parameter. PCC indicates partial correlation
coefficients for mean daily prevalence and the value of a particular
parameter. This shows the effects of a particular parameter regardless of
all other parameters. For example, transmission and shedding rates have
the strongest effects on mean daily prevalence, where higher rates
mean higher prevalence.
Additional file 3: Figure S2. Same as Figure 1B except that stay-time
was 1 day.
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